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HUMAN RIGHTS AND
TRANSNATIONAL CULTURE:
REGULATING GENDER VIOLENCE
THROUGH GLOBAL LAW©
SALLY ENGLE MERRY*
In the current era of human rights activism, the
global production of human rights approaches to
violence against women generates a wide variety of
localization processes. Activists translate between
global discourses and local contexts and meanings.
Culture is conceptualized in quite different and
sometimes contradictory ways in this process.
Essentialized ideas of culture inhibit recognition of the
potential contributions of local cultural practices and
provide justifications for groups to resist these
changes. This article shows, with reference to a case
study of Fiji, that a more anthropological conception
of culture provides a better picture of the localization
process and foregrounds the role of activists who
translate between global human rights ideas and local
grievances.
A notre 6poque ofi s'exprime 'activisme en
faveur des droits de la personne, Ia production
mondiale de d6marches, de la perspective des droits de
la personne envers la violence contre les femmes,
engendre une grande diversit6 de processus de
localisation. Les activistes circulent entre les discours
mondiaux, et les contextes Iocaux et significations
locales. Dans cc processus, la culture est
conceptualis6e de nombreuses faqons tr~s diff~rentes,
parfois contradictoires. Les id6es essentialis6es de
culture inhibent la reconnaissance des contributions
potentielles qu'apportent les pratiques culturelles
locales, et fournissent aux groupes des justifications
leur permettant de r6sister i ces changements. Se
r6f6rant A une 6tude de cas de Fidji, cet article montre
qu'une conception plus anthropologique de Ia culture
repr6sente plus fidelement le processus de localisation,
et fait ressortir le r6le des activistes qui circulent entre
les id6es mondiales concernant les droits de la
personne, et les griefs locaux.
I. IN TR O D U CTIO N .............................................................................................. 54
IL. THEORIZING THE GLOBAL/LOCAL INTERFACE ................................. 60
III. THE FIJI REPORT TO CEDAW AND
THE PROBLEM OF BULUBULU .................................................................. 65
IV . CO N CLU SIO N ................................................................................................... 74
©2006, S.E. Merry.
New York University. Prepared for presentation at the Harry W. Arthurs Symposium,
Toronto, 5 May 2005. The research described in this article was generously supported by the
National Science Foundation, Cultural Anthropology Program and Law and Social Sciences
Program, BCS-9904441, Wellesley College, and the Mellon New Directions Fellowship. I had the
benefit of spending a year as a fellow at the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at the Kennedy
School, Harvard University.
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
I. INTRODUCTION
It was Harry Arthurs who first persuaded me that legal pluralism
was not only a phenomenon of small-scale societies that had been
incorporated into colonial states, but also of modern industrial society.
He made clear that all societies have plural systems of law, and that the
relationships among them are continually being redrawn over time. He
was an intellectual mainstay of a wonderful seminar on critical legal
pluralism sponsored by the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research,
of which I was a member for several years. I am also grateful to Harry
for reminding me of the imperial nature of my country, the United
States, particularly with regard to Canada. He always emphasized to me
the limitations of thinking of social justice only in terms of rights,
pointing in particular to the flaws in the rights-conscious United States,
which has strayed far from its earlier, more socialist ideals. Current
developments in the United States confirm his worry about the dangers
of focusing on justice only in terms of individual rights rather than on
the collective good. Harry's insights have continued to shape my work,
for which I am grateful.
I draw on these insights as I explore another instance of
contemporary legal pluralism: the rise of the international system of
human rights law. I began to conduct research on human rights law
because it represents an emerging dimension of legal pluralism,
analogous to imperialism but in some ways quite different. I wanted to
compare the pluralism generated by the imposition of American law and
legal institutions on indigenous law in Hawaii during the nineteenth
century, with that which occurred when the transnational system was not
imperial U.S. or British law but human rights law.' The expansions of
both forms of transnational law are serendipitous and negotiated
processes that take place within great inequalities of wealth and power.
The Hawaii research revealed that the colonizing process was less one of
simple imposition than one of negotiation. This was, of course, a
negotiation, taking place in the context of vast inequalities of power.
Hawaiian political elites sought to retain sovereignty through
transforming the legal system into a form that was acceptable to the
global powers of Europe and North America. A gunship in Honolulu's
Sally Engle Merry, Colonizing Hawaii. The Cultural Power of Law (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2000).
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harbor with its cannons trained on the town was a common way for
global powers to persuade the Hawaiian King and Chiefs to go along
with their wishes. Similarly, contemporary human rights projects take
place in an ever-increasing situation of global inequality. This inequality
determines which countries can pressure which other ones to change,
where the funding for Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) activism
comes from and who receives it, and which offences are foregrounded
and which ignored.
In my present research, I have become increasingly interested in
the role of intermediaries, or translators, between plural legal systems.
These are people who live in two worlds and navigate between them,
interpreting each to the other. Such translators were critical during
Hawaii's imperial encounters of the nineteenth century. They are critical
now as human rights ideas are appropriated, encouraged, and resisted in
many locations around the world. Translators are people who move
between local and global sets of cultural understandings, helping each to
make sense of the other. I recognize how problematic the terms "global"
and "local" are in practice; here they stand multiply for location,
orientation, social class, education, mobility, and wealth.2
The impact of human rights law depends, as does all law, on
changing local consciousness of rights and relationships. In order for
human rights ideas to be effective, they need to be translated into local
terms and situated within local contexts of power and meaning. They
need, in other words, to be remade in the vernacular. How does this
happen? Do people in local communities reframe human rights ideas to
fit into their system of cultural meanings? Do they resist ideas that seem
unfamiliar? Examining this process is crucial to understanding the way
human rights act in the contemporary world.
Remaking human rights in the vernacular is difficult. Local
communities often conceive of social justice and fairness in quite
different terms from human rights activists. They lack knowledge of
relevant documents and provisions of the human rights system. Global
human rights reformers, on the other hand, are typically rooted in a
transnational legal culture remote from the myriad local social
situations in which human rights are needed. Nevertheless, global
human rights law has become an important resource for local social
2 These issues are discussed further in Sally Merry, Human Rights and Gender Violence:
Translating International Law into Local Justice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).
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movements. This article explores how global law is translated into the
vernacular, highlighting the role of activists who serve as intermediaries
between different sets of cultural understandings of gender, violence,
and justice.
Gender violence provides an ideal issue for examining this
process. As a human rights violation, gender violence is a relative
newcomer, but since the 1990s it has become the centrepiece of
women's human rights. Strenuous activism by NGOs along with a series
of major world conferences on women in the 1980s and 1990s defined
violence against women as a human rights violation. But establishing
women's rights as human rights is still an uphill struggle. Because
violence against women refers to bodily injury as do other human rights
violations, such as torture, it is a relatively straightforward violation.
Like torture, it is about injury, pain, and death. However, in many parts
of the world it appears to be an everyday, normal problem, not a serious
violation of human rights.3 Moreover, because gender violence is deeply
embedded in systems of kinship, religion, warfare, and nationalism, its
prevention requires major social changes in communities, families, and
nations. Powerful local groups often resist these changes.
The relevance of human rights for the campaign against
violence against women has taken on new importance as human rights
have become the major global approach to social justice. Since the
1980s, human rights concepts have gained increasing international
credibility and support at the same time as a growing body of treaties
and resolutions have strengthened their international legal basis. The
global human rights system is now deeply transnational, no longer
rooted exclusively in the West. It is present in global settings with
representatives from nations and NGOs around the world. Activists from
many countries enthusiastically adopt human rights language and
translate it for grassroots people. Vulnerable people take up human
rights ideas in a wide variety of local contexts because these ideas offer
hope to subordinated groups. An Indo-Fijian lawyer told me, for
example, that she had experienced racism and discrimination in Fiji and
-As it did in the United States less than thirty years ago. Research in India in the 1990s
shows that about half of ever-married women (56 per cent) think that men have the right to hit
their wives in response to some kinds of offenses. India: National Family Health Survey
(International Institute for Population Sciences: 1998-99) at 72-73, online: National Family Health
Survey, India <http://www.nfhsindia.org/india2.html>.
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in New Zealand and only the international human rights system gave
her the tools and consciousness to fight back. In the New Territories of
Hong Kong, women were denied the right to inherit property under a
law passed by the British colonial government and legitimated as ancient
Chinese custom, even though it had long since been changed in China.
The international human rights language of women's rights and sex
discrimination proved critical to overturning this legislation.
However, the idea that everyday violence against women is a
human rights violation has not been easy to establish, nor has it moved
readily from transnational to local settings. There are fissures between
the global settings where human rights ideas are codified into
documents and the local communities where the subjects of these rights
live and work. Human rights ideas, embedded in cultural assumptions
about the nature of the person, the community, and the state, do not
translate simply from one setting to another. If human rights ideas are
to have an impact, they need to become part of the consciousness of
ordinary people around the world. Considerable research on law and
everyday social life shows that law's power to shape society depends not
on punishment alone but on becoming. embedded in everyday social
practices, shaping the rules people carry in their heads.4 Yet, there is a
great distance between the global sites where these ideas are formulated
and the specific situations in which they are deployed. We know
relatively little about how individuals in various social and cultural
contexts come to see themselves in terms of human rights.
Nor do ideas and approaches move readily the other way-from
local to global settings. Global sites are a bricolage of issues and ideas
brought to the table by national actors. But transnational actors are
often uninterested in local social practices or too busy to understand
them in their complicated contexts. Even some national elites share this
view. Discussions in transnational settings rarely deal with local
situations in context. There is an inevitable tension between general
principles and particular situations. Transnational reformers must
adhere to a set of standards that apply to all societies if they are to gain
4 See e.g. Austin Sarat & Thomas Kearns, eds., Law and Everyday Life (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 1993); Patricia Ewick & Susan Silbey, The Common Place of Law
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998); and Sally Engle Merry, Getting Justice and Getting
Even: Legal Consciousness among Working-Class Americans (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1990).
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legitimacy. Moreover, they have neither the time nor the desire to tailor
these standards to the particularities of each individual country, ethnic
group, or regional situation. National and local actors often feel
frustrated at the lack of attention to their individual situations.
The division between transnational elites and local actors is
based less on culture or tradition than on tensions between a
transnational community that envisions a unified modernity and
national and local actors for whom particular histories and contexts are
of critical importance. Intermediaries such as NGO and social movement
activists play a critical role in interpreting the cultural world of
transnational modernity for local claimants. They appropriate, translate,
and remake transnational discourses into the vernacular. At the same
time, they take local stories and frame them in national and
international human rights language. Translators often participate in
two cultural spheres at the same time; translating between them with a
kind of double consciousness.
What is the interface between global and local activism? How do
ideas about violence against women as a human rights violation, which
are produced in global conferences in New York and Geneva, get
appropriated in local community centers in Hawaii, Delhi, Beijing, Fiji,
and Hong Kong? The language of human rights contributes to
transnational and local social movements and a gradual rethinking of
gender inequality around the world. It creates a political space for
reform using a language legitimated by a global consensus on standards.
But this political space comes with a price. Human rights promote ideas
of individual autonomy, equality, choice, and secularism even when
these ideas differ from prevailing cultural norms and practices. Human
rights ideas displace alternative visions of social justice that are less
individualistic and more focused on communities and responsibilities,
possibly contributing to the cultural homogenization of local
communities. The localization of human rights reflects the vastly
unequal global distribution of power and resources that channels how
ideas develop in global settings and how they are picked up or rejected
in local places.
In January 2002, in the grand conference room of the United
Nations in New York, the delegation from Fiji presented its very first
report to the committee, monitoring the Convention on the Elimination
[VOL. 44, NO. I
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of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). 5 Government
and NGO representatives from Fiji had flown half way around the world
for this hearing. As the government delegation presented its report to
the CEDAW monitoring committee, made up of twenty-three experts on
gender issues from around the world, some tension developed over a
Fijian customary practice called bulubulu. The conflict illustrated the
challenges of communicating across the fault line separating the
transnational human rights community from local and national spaces.
The Fiji country report noted that bulubulu, a traditional village custom
for reconciling differences, was being used to take rape cases out of
court. The committee asked the government delegation when they were
going to eliminate this custom.6 However, the concern expressed in the
report was not about the custom itself but about using it to get rape
cases out of court. The problem suddenly seemed more complicated
than just eliminating the custom. I wondered why the experts jumped to
that conclusion. Why did they assume that the custom itself was the
problem rather than its application to court cases? And why did they
focus on culture and religion rather than economic or political
conditions that might affect the way the custom functions?
The experts concluded that the custom was the problem because
they saw "customs" as harmful practices rooted in traditional culture.
Customs oppress women and need to be changed. The experts have
neither the time nor the inclination to investigate when and how
customs such as bulubulu are better able to protect women from rape
than the courts; nor do they have the time or inclination to investigate
how these customs are intersecting with state legal systems in new ways.
Their task is to apply the law of the Convention. There is a general
assumption that problems such as violence against women are the
responsibility of the state and that local culture is an excuse for non-
compliance. The divide between transnational, national, and local
activists is exacerbated by their differing understandings of the concept
of culture.
After discussing various ways that culture is conceptualized in
contemporary human rights practice, I will return to the question of
Report from the Government of Fiji to CEDAW, 26th Sess., CEDAW/C/FJI/1 (2002).
6 The government minister was annoyed and said that bulubulu was essential to Fijian
village life and could not be given up. Interview of Losena Salabula, Assistant Minister of Fiji's
Ministry for Women, Social Welfare and Poverty Alleviation [on file with the author].
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bulubulu to show how a more anthropological conception of culture
would facilitate the translation of ideas to improve communication
among cosmopolitan global and local spaces. This conception would
also inhibit the creation of nationalistic forms of opposition to global
human rights categories that are engendered by essentialized concepts
of culture.
II. THEORIZING THE GLOBAL/LOCAL INTERFACE
The global/local divide is often conceptualized as the opposition
between rights and culture, or even civilization and culture. Those who
resist human rights often claim to be defending culture. For example,
male lineage heads in the rural New Territories of Hong Kong claimed
that giving women rights to inherit land would destroy the social fabric.
Fijian politicians worried that restricting the use of a bulubulu might
undermine Fijian culture. However, as considerable work within
anthropology and sociology has demonstrated, these arguments depend
on a very narrow understanding of culture and the political
misinterpretation of this concept.' Amartya Sen provides an eloquent
critique of this notion of culture in his advocacy of a human rights
approach to development.8 As Cowan, Dembour, and Wilson point out,
a more flexible and contested model of culture provides a better way of
understanding the practice of human rights both in global sites such as
international meetings and local sites where these ideas are picked up
and used by social movements and non-governmental organizations.9
Even as anthropologists and others have repudiated the idea of
culture as a consensual, interconnected system of beliefs and values, the
idea has taken on new life in the public sphere, particularly with
reference to the global South. For example, in 2002 1 was interviewed by
a local radio station about an incident in Pakistan that resulted in the
7 See especially Richard A. Wilson, "Introduction: Human Rights, Culture and Context" in
Richard A. Wilson, ed., Human Rights, Culture and Context. Anthropological Perspectives
(London: Pluto Press, 1996) 1; Jane K. Cowan, Marie-Benedict Dembour & Richard Wilson, eds.,
Culture and Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) at 6-7; and Abdullahi An-
Na'im & Jeffrey Hammond, "Cultural Transformation and Human Rights in African Societies" in
Abdullahi An-Naa'im, ed., Cultural Transformation and Human Rights in Africa (London: Zed
Books, 2002) 13 at 13-14.
' Development as Freedom (New York: Knopf, 1999) at 240-46.
9 Cowan, Dembour & Wilson, supra note 7 at 13-14.
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gang rape of a young woman, an assault apparently authorized by a local
tribal council. The interviewer, who was looking for someone to speak
on the radio show, wanted to know if I was willing to defend the
council's actions. I explained that I considered this an inexcusable act,
that many Pakistani women's rights and human rights groups and the
Pakistani press had condemned the rape, and that it was connected to
local political struggles. The woman was of a subordinate group in the
village and had been attacked by members of the dominant landowning
group. I said it should not be seen as an expression of Pakistani
"'culture." Indeed, it was the local Imam, an Islamic religious leader,
who talked about the incident in his Friday sermon and made it known
to the world, condemning the actions as unfitting for a panchayat and
for Islam.
The interviewer was distressed. She wanted me to defend the
value of respecting Pakistani culture at all costs, despite the sentence of
rape. When I told her that I could not do that, she wanted to know if I
knew of any other anthropologists who would. I could think of none, but
I began to wonder what she thought about anthropologists and their
views of culture. She apparently assumed that anthropologists made no
moral judgments about "cultures" and failed to recognize the
contestation and changes taking place within contemporary local
communities around the world. Apparently cultures have no contact
with the expansion of capitalism, the arming of various groups by
transnational superpowers using them for proxy wars, or the cultural
possibilities of human rights as an emancipatory discourse. I found this
interviewer's view of culture wrong-headed and her opinion of
anthropology discouraging.
But she was clearly reflecting a wider public opinion. Her view
was echoed by U.S. and U.K. news coverage of the event. The Omaha
World Herald editorialized that
Pakistan may be an ally of the United States in the fight against terrorism, but Americans
should have no illusions about how deeply into rural and backward portions of the nation
the veneer of civilized law and order extends .... This abhorrent action may make it
easier to understand how Islamic militants, even terrorists, can sprout and grow in some
parts of the country.'
0
'o Kamila Shamsie, "Women: Child abuse in Belgium 'shocks the nation'-so why is gang
rape in Pakistan 'a cultural issue'?" The Guardian (6 September 2002) G2 at 7.
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A journalist in London pointed out that the U.K. press did not
report any surprise in Pakistan over the event, in contrast to the outrage
it described in Belgium when nineteen men raped or abused an eleven
year old child. 1 She too reports being asked to discuss the case on a
radio show and explain "the culture behind it." She rejected the idea
that Pakistan is a nation with a culture of rape that does nothing until
international human rights groups take up the case. Instead, she sees
Pakistan as a country where there is a grim struggle between progressive
factions and those who want to return to more repressive gender
regimes. The Pakistani press did express a great deal of outrage about
the incident. Fourteen men were arrested soon after the rape and
quickly tried in an anti-terrorist court; six were sentenced to death only
nine weeks after the incident.' 2 They were, however, released in 2005.
The Minister for Women visited the remote village and gave a
substantial cheque to the affected family. 3,
To view this incident as symptomatic of Pakistani culture is
analogous to seeing the Enron thefts as characteristic of American
culture. When corporate executives in the United States steal millions of
dollars through accounting fraud, we do not criticize American culture
as a whole. We recognize that these actions come from the greed of a
few along with sloppy institutional arrangements that allow them to get
away with it. Similarly, the actions of a single tribal council in Pakistan
do not characterize the entire country as if it were a homogeneous
entity. Although Pakistan and many of its communities do have
practices and laws that subordinate women and subject them to
violence, these are neither universal nor uncontested. Pakistan as a
''culture" can be indicted by this particular council's authorization of
rape only if culture is understood as a homogenous entity whose rules
evoke universal compliance. Despite widespread critiques,14  this
1 1 Ibid.
Press Trust of India (1 September 2002).
Press Trust of India (2 July 2002).
'
4 See An-Na'im & Hammond, supra note 5; Cowen, Dembour & Wilson supra note 7; Sen,
supra note 8; Christine J. Walley, "Searching for 'Voices': Feminism, Anthropology, and the Global
Debate over Female Genital Operations" (1997) 12:3 Cultural Antropology 405; and Deborah M.
Weissman, "The Human Rights Dilemma: Rethinking the Humanitarian Project" (2004) 35:2
Colum. H.R.L. Rev. 259.
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essentialized concept of culture remains a powerful idea within popular
culture.
Seeing culture as open to change emphasizes struggles over
cultural values within local communities and encourages attention to
local cultural practices as resources for change. An example from
Australia illustrates this complex understanding of culture. At a
conference on culture and violence against women held in Sydney,
Australia in 2002, representatives from an Australian Aboriginal group
dealing with violence against women displayed a brochure they had
developed for battered women that was richly decorated with the swirls
and spots of Aboriginal art. They drew on the artistic traditions of
Aboriginal peoples to tailor information about how to seek help for
battering in a way that might appeal to other Aboriginal women. But
this is not the only way to localize imported practices. Representatives
from another Aboriginal group described their efforts to protect young
Aboriginal men from harassment in the shopping malls in Sydney. They
had developed a tee-shirt. The back of the tee-shirt listed the legal rights
of people in public spaces while the front displayed several stylized
faces, some apparently Aboriginal, and the phrase, "It's public space,
Get Outta My Face."' 5 As the Aboriginal presenter pointed out, "get
outta my face" is a phrase commonly used by young Aboriginal people
and therefore the one the young people chose for the tee-shirt. The
words and images were not those of Aboriginal art but of African
Americans. The young people, facing racism in Australia, chose a
phrase from the transnational language of resistance to racism. They
localized their claims torights with transnational images. This example
shows the creativity and flexibility of culture in its mobilization by local
activists. Appropriating signs and sentiments is fundamental to the way
culture works within contemporary globalization.
Moreover, local cultural practices are far more fluid and open to
change than the essentialized model suggests. For example, Celestine
Nyamu-Musembi shows how local norms and practices in Kenya offer
opportunities as well as barriers to gender equality and that the
production of local custom is a dynamic and changing process, even
"5 Presentation from Wirringa Baiya/Tranby Aboriginal Cooperative College, Sydney, 22
February 2002.
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when it specifies inheritance practices.16 She concludes, "a genuine
engagement with practice at the local level is powerful in dislodging
both the abolitionist imagination of the local as the repository of
unchanging patriarchal values and the defensive relativist portrayal of
local norms as bounded, immutable, and well settled."' 7 Husgaina J.
Abdullah's analysis of women's groups in Nigeria shows how over time
these groups change their approaches to women's rights-including
their willingness to invoke human rights-depending on the shift from
military to civilian government, economic crises, and the growth of
religious fundamentalism. 8 These studies present a complex and fluid
understanding of culture.
The way culture is conceptualized determines how social change
is imagined. If culture is fixed and unchanging, it is simply a barrier that
needs to be removed through education. If culture is a set of practices
and meanings shaped by institutional contexts, it is both malleable and
embedded in structures of power. These different. perspectives on
culture affect policies concerning women. For example, in Uruguay's
country report to the committee monitoring the Women's Convention,
the government expressed regret that more women were not involved in
politics and blamed cultural traditions, women's involvement in
domestic tasks, and the differences in wages by gender.' 9 In contrast,
facing the same absence of women politicians, Denmark offered funds
to offset babysitting expenses when women attended meetings." In the
first case, the barrier to change is theorized as cultural tradition; in the
second case, as institutional arrangements of child care. The first model
sees culture as fixed; the second assumes that the meanings of gender
will change as institutional and legal arrangements change.
Culture defined only as tradition or as national essence implies
that villages are full of culture but that there is no culture in the
conference halls of New York and Geneva. Yet, culture is as important
6 "Are Local Norms and Practices Fences or Pathways? The Example of Women's
Property Rights" in An-Naim, ed., supra note 7, 126 at 133-34.
17 Ibid. at 145.
""Religious Revivalism, Human Rights Activism and the Struggle for Women's Rights in
Nigeria" in An-Na'im, ed., supra note 7, 151.
"9 Report from the Government of Uraguay to CEDAW, 26th Sess., CEDAW/C/URY/2-3
(2002).
29 UN, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,_
C/DEN/5, 3 July 2000:16.
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in shaping human rights conferences as it is in structuring village
mortuary rituals. Thinking of those peoples, who were formerly labeled
"backward," as the only bearers of culture neglects the centrality of
culture to the practice of human rights. UN meetings are deeply shaped
by a culture of transnational modernity, one that specifies procedures
for collaborative decision making, conceptions of global social justice,
and definitions of gender roles. Human rights law is itself primarily a
cultural system. Its limited enforcement mechanisms mean that the
impact of human rights law is a matter of persuasion rather than force,
of cultural transformation rather than coercive change. Its documents
create new cultural frameworks for conceptualizing social justice. It is
ironic that the human rights system tends to promote its new cultural
vision through a critique of culture.
III. THE FIJI REPORT TO CEDAW AND THE PROBLEM OF
BULUBULU
Let me return to the example of bulubulu at the UN hearing. The
country report is a procedure in which a country prepares a detailed
report concerning its compliance with the international convention after
it has been ratified. Within this procedure exists a committee whose
purpose is to monitor a country's compliance with the convention on
women's rights, which it has signed. The goal is to assess the extent to
which the country's practices conform to these global principles of law.
Yet, these hearings do not consider the contexts within which local
practices are carried out, contexts that determine the meaning and
implication of these practices. This gap between a global vision of justice
and the way local contexts shape that vision, creates a fundamental
dilemma for human rights practice. There is an inevitable struggle
between the generalizing strategies of the transnational elites who
construct a global law and the particularities of situations in which this
law is applied. It is grounded in a legal rationality that insists on
universal application of the law.
Let me illustrate this tension with a story. At the January 2002
presentation of its report to the committee monitoring CEDAW, the
Fijian government report raised the problem of bulubulu in the context
of a critique of the courts' failure to intervene firmly in sexual assault
and violence cases.
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The prevalent attitudes about gender-based violence are reflected in the relatively
lenient penalties imposed on offenders. For example, rape is a form of violence that is
particularly directed against women. Despite the serious nature of this crime, Fiji's courts
tend to treat rape and indecent assault as reconcilable in the same way as common
assault and it is currently the only form of serious crime that can be reconciled.
Furthermore, the Fijian custom of bulubulu (apology and recompense/reconciliation) is
accepted by the courts as a reason not to impose a charge or custodial sentence on a
convicted rapist. In some cases, the victim's father accepts the apology and the victim has
little say in the outcome. This situation is changing, largely as a result of active lobbying
by women's organizations. This is evident from a recent judgment by a magistrate for the
award of the maximum sentence. The magistrate commented: " Women are your equal
and therefore must not be discriminated on the basis ofgender. Men should be aware of
the provisions of the CEDA W, which our country had [sic] ratified Under the Convention
the State shall ensure that all forms of discrimination against women must be eliminated
at all costs. The courts shall be the watch-dog with the obligation. The old school of
thought, that women were inferior to men, or part ofyourpersonalproperty, that can be
discarded or treated unfairly at will, is now obsolete and no longer accepted by our
society. I hope that this sentence imposed on you, shall be a deterrent to all those who
are still practicing this outmoded evil and cruel behaviour (from Fiji Daily Post, Jan 20,
2000)." Offenses against property are, however, still more likely to attract custodial and
lengthier sentences than rape, even though rape is a felony for which the maximum
sentence is life imprisonment.21
It is important to notice that this statement is a critique of the
legal system and its ineffectiveness in dealing with rape. Recourse to
bulubulu is presented as one reason the legal system is not more
effective.
In the questions they posed to the Fiji government, the CEDAW
committee challenged the custom itself.22 One expert said that it
sounded like bulubulu was a very old and very patriarchal custom and
asked, "Have you provided to eliminate that custom? What has your
ministry done to abolish this practice?" Another said it provided an
escape route for people who commit crimes against women to avoid
punishment. At least two experts asked, "When will this practice be
made illegal?" One said,
21 UN, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
C/Fiji/i, 14 March 2000: 11.
22 UN, Press Release, "Committee on Elimination of Discrimination against Women
Considers Initial Report of Fiji" (16 January 2002), online: United Nations Press Release
<http://ww.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/0/CC8B1034DD20FB46C1256B45002BOB02?opendo
cument>.
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While acknowledging the importance of cultural practices, and even the importance of
reconciliation, we think it is important that the requirements of the convention be
attended to, especially in the case of sexual violence. Thus it is important to the
committee that you increase awareness of practices such as bulbulu, and of rape,
because sometimes the impact of rape comes years after negotiation takes place.
23
According to a UN Press release, "[a] question was asked about
the custom of 'bulu-bulu,' which imposed only a custodial sentence on
the convicted rapists. The victim's father had a right to accept an
apology from him, and the victim herself had no say in that situation.
What was being done to abolish such practices? '24 These questions
reveal the slippage between condemning the use of bulubulu for rape
and condemning the practice altogether.
The Fiji government objected to this critique of bulubulu. In its
official reply to the CEDAW committee, Assistant Minister of Fiji's
Ministry for Women, Social Welfare and Poverty Alleviation, Losena
Salabula said:
[Bulu-bulu is] a vital custom of the indigenous Fijian community for reconciliation and
cementing kinship ties. The Government was addressing its recurrent abuse in relation to
modern court processes and the legal system in handling sexual offences such as rape.
The acceptance of "bulu-bulu" often led women victims not to report crimes. Offenders
were discharged and sentences mitigated. Improved awareness of the practice had
allowed the law to take its course on sexual offences. In some cases, families had
declined the offer of "bulu-bulu". In other cases, families had accepted "bulu-bulu" but
had agreed that the law should take its course. The reform of the sentencing law, which
was at an advanced phase, was aimed at codifying sentencing options and guidelines."
In response to this report, the Committee's Chairperson,
Charlotte Abaka of Ghana, said that while acknowledging the
importance. of national traditions, especially the practice of
reconciliation, it was important to do away with traditions discriminating
against women, especially in the case of domestic violence. The country
should pay more attention to negative aspects of the problem, such as
the practice of bulubulu, she said. Measures were needed to increase
2 Quotations are based on the author's notes.
24 Supra note 22.
UN, Press Release, "Completing Consideration of Fiji Report, Committee Told
Convention is 'A Living Reality' in Fiji" (22 January 2002), online: United Nations Press Release
<http://www.unhchr.chhuricane/huricane.nsf/view0l/549AB277E823E35BC1256B4A00306425?op
endocument>.
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public awareness of the issues involved. It was also disturbing that some
cases of violence were referred to as "family discipline" in Fiji.26
The Committee's Concluding Comments criticized bulubulu for
providing legitimacy to rape. After stating the committee's concern
about the high incidence of ethnic and gender-based violence in civil
unrest, and about domestic violence and sexual abuse of girls and
women, the Concluding Comments say, "[t]he Committee is also
concerned that the social customs on the husband's right of
chastisement, and 'bulu bulu,' give social legitimacy to violence."27 The
Committee requests the State party to strengthen its initiatives against
gender-based violence and to adopt proposed laws on domestic violence
and sexual offences. "In particular, it calls on the State party to
reinforce its 'no drop' policy by prohibiting the reconciliation of cases of
rape and sexual assault on the basis of the 'bulu bulu' custom."28
The Assistant Minister for Women said that the CEDAW
committee did not understand bulubulu and how important it is, and
noted that there have already been legal decisions, that define it as
inappropriate for rape.29 The problem is not the custom but its use for
rape, which has already been judicially ruled inappropriate, although in
all likelihood the practice continues. She said that eliminating bulubulu
was impossible since it was the basis of village life. The custom was used
for a wide range of conflicts and disputes as well as for arranging
marriages. Without it, the village could not function. She said that the
people who wrote the report did not know Fijian custom. "The Fijian
people won't let this go, this custom. If they don't have it, society will fall
apart."3 Changing bulubulu, she said,
26 Ibid.
27 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Concluding
Comments, A/57/38 (Part I) (2002) at para. 58, online: Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights, <http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/ 206085180eaba54fc1256c6a003b956a?
Opendocument>.
8 UN, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
A/57/38(Part 1): 12 (2002) at para. 59.
29 Interview of Losena Salabula, supra note 6.
30 Ibid.
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is very contradictory with our culture. When the family wants a girl, they will plant for
her for three or four years, and present things for her. It is an investment. But now, with
women's rights, you can marry anyone you want, and forget about this custom. 3 1
Here she refers to the use of elopement as a way of marrying
instead of the protracted marriage arrangements and exchanges
normally expected. It is typically followed by a gesture of reconciliation
by the family of the groom to the family of the bride in the form of a
bulubulu ceremony.
In response to the critique of bulubulu as well as criticism of
racial policies and affirmative action for Fijians from this and other UN
treaty bodies, she said that if the international community did not like
what Fiji did, Fiji would go its own way. She felt that the committee did
not understand bulubulu, and the formal nature of the setting prevented
her from explaining it to them.
Her comments reflect contemporary Fijian politics: a nationalist
ethnic Fijian movement is asserting the centrality of Fijian village life to
the nation. The Women's Minister did not defend the use of bulubulu
for rape, but she did insist on the importance of bulubulu for village
conflict resolution. At the end of our meeting, the minister gave an
impassioned plea for Fijian tradition, which she says this individualist
human rights system is disrupting. Her central concern was that the
Fijian culture and its conditions were not understood, that the "expert"
label of the CEDAW committee members sounded intimidating, and that
they did not appreciate the particularities and specific features of Fiji.
How did this discussion between the Fiji government
representatives and the CEDAW experts go wrong? Both groups shared a
concern about an overly lenient treatment for rape. Yet, they seem to
have spoken past each other. Using village reconciliation for rape could
certainly fail to protect a victim, but it was also clear that the courts were
not working effectively. Perhaps it depended on how bulubulu actually
functioned in different contexts.
In order to answer this question, two critically important points
should be considered. First, bulubulu can to some extent redeem a
woman's honour and punish the offender, but only if there are powerful
kin groups and strong leaders. This tends to be true only of villages, not
urban areas. It is an ancient practice in Fiji, often used by subordinates
31 Ibid.
2006]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
to deflect the wrath of their superiors in a hierarchical system. It is a way
of making peace and avoiding vengeance between two kin groups,
usually matagali or lineages, after there has been an injury. It is used to
resolve many conflicts in villages but not often rape. When it is used for
rape, it is typically a strategy for apologizing to the family of the victim
and sometimes offering restitution such as arable land. The apology is
delivered to senior males in the family, and the victim is rarely consulted
about whether she wishes to accept it. It is possible for this ceremony to
enable her to marry, however, and somewhat diminish the stigma of
sexual violation. Moreover, in some cases, the senior males of the
offender's kin group hold the offender accountable, reprimanding him
or punishing him with violence.
However, the nature of village life has changed dramatically
during 150 years of contact with Europeans, colonialism, and since 1970,
independence. About half of the country's population are people of
Indian ancestry, brought to work the sugar fields by the British colonial
government and Australian sugar plantations. The population is now
largely literate and increasingly urban. By 2000 about 40 per cent of the
ethnic Fijian population lived in urban or peri-urban settings.32 As
village life has changed, so has the practice of bulubulu.33
Some urbanites have begun to redefine the custom itself. For
example, one powerful woman, who was highly placed in the Methodist
church, described how she responded to an abusive husband whose wife
had taken refuge in her house. When the husband arrived offering to
reconcile with his wife using bulubulu, the Methodist woman received
the request, but did not accept it herself. She consulted with the
victimized wife and did not insist that she accept the apology when the
wife refused. Indeed, the abused woman stayed with her senior relative
for a year, despite her husband's frequent pleas that she return. She
finally agreed to return home, but by her own decision. In this case, the
affluent urban woman revised bulubulu to allow the victim herself to
choose whether to accept the apology. In addition, she changed the
2 Brij V. Lal, "Making History, Becoming History: Reflections on Fijian Coups and
Constitutions" (2002) 14 The Contemp. Pac 148 at 155.
W hen I talked to a variety of people in the urban areas, some reported that ceremonies
were not taken seriously and offenders were barely reprimanded. Others regretted the change in
marriage practices so that couples eloped without the ritual exchanges formerly fundamental to the
process.
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process because she was a woman. However, she did rely on her adult
son to serve as a male kinsman along side her. This example shows that
bulubulu can be retained in urban areas, but may be performed in very
different ways.
In village practice, the girl would not have been asked her
opinion about accepting the apology, and the apology would be
delivered to the kin group, not to the victim. Within close-knit villages,
this custom could reinstate a woman's virtue and punish the offender,
but it was basically designed to prevent killing between the kin groups.
The gift of a tabua or whale's tooth provided a way to make peace within
villages. As the nature of Fijian society has changed, the custom itself
has begun to shift from a practice that focuses on preventing vengeance
between clans to one that supports a victim and holds the offender
accountable.
A second important point is that the real grievance of the
CEDAW women's groups was not the use of bulubulu for rape cases, but
the use of bulubulu to persuade prosecutors to drop charges and
magistrates to mitigate sentences. In other words, their complaint was
not the use of bulubulu itself but the way it was being used to undermine
the legal process. They were concerned about the legal system's
willingness to be deterred by assertions that bulubulu had been done.
Indeed, the anti-rape campaign criticizing bulubulu began in the late
1980s after a judge issued more stringent guidelines for rape cases and
defendants began to search out alternatives for escaping these new,
more severe penalties. Bulubulu was one of them. The mounting
enthusiasm for bulubulu was also fostered in the 1980s and 1990s by a
growing Fijian nationalism that sought to exclude Indo-Fijians from
political power and celebrate Fijian village life as the essence of the
nation. Coups in 1987 and 2000 underscored the unwillingness of some
Fijian political leaders to share power with Indo-Fijians, although the
issues are more complicated than any simple ethnic conflict. One of the
demands of Fijian nationalists was the creation of traditional Fijian
courts. Although there were efforts to create such courts in the 1990s,
with substantial funds dedicated to the project, it appears that there are
no courts in operation.34
-4 My research assistant, Eleanor Kleiber, was unable to find any indication that these
courts were operating when she interviewed the person who, at least in theory, was running them in
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Indeed, when I reread the Fiji country report to CEDAW, I.
realized that the report itself complained about the use of bulubulu to
diminish the effectiveness of the courts, not about the custom itself.
Even the leader of the anti-rape campaign had no objection to the use
of bulubulu in parallel with the courts; she just did not want it to replace
the courts.35 The critique of the Fiji feminists, then, was not about the
use of a traditional reconciliation procedure for rape, but about the way
the modern courts were allowing bulubulu to diminish their
effectiveness. Nor were they concerned about the use of bulubulu in
rural villages, but primarily in urban areas.
This analysis raises the question: why did the experts
misinterpret the use of bulubulu? And what does this tell us about the
tensions between global law and local situations? The UN discussion did
not deal with the complexity of the custom or its use, but focused on the
problem of the custom itself. The experts discussed not only avoiding
bulubulu for rape cases, but also eliminating bulubulu itself. Neither the
report, nor the NGO representatives, nor the government representative
made 'clear how fundamental and widespread the practice is, nor how
often or how long it had been used for rape. Obviously, they did not
have the time to read the anthropological literature and interview Fijian
leaders about the practice. This lack of detailed, specific knowledge is an
inevitable feature of such transnational forums. Yet, there are at least
two other explanations as well. The first is a cultural, interpretive one,
the second a more structural one linked to the nature of human rights
monitoring.
First, the committee moved quickly from condemning the use of
the custom for rape to a condemnation of the custom altogether
because many of the CEDAW committee members assumed that the
problem they confronted was one of a "custom" embedded in
"traditional culture." They were inclined to condemn the entire practice,
not just its use for rape. They talked about bulubulu as a barbaric
custom for handling rape by compensation, an example of a harmful
traditional practice that needs to be changed to improve the status of
women. The custom was defined as a violation in and of itself rather
2003. High-ranking lawyers and prosecutors told me that, despite a substantial expenditure of
government funds over the last decade, there were in fact no Fijian courts in operation.
' Interview of Peni Moore (2002) [on file with the author].
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than as one inappropriately applied to a particular kind of offence in the
context of an urban criminal case used to derail more severe legal
penalties.
The experts hearing these reports bring to their work a concept
of culture that shapes the way they interpret what they hear. Having
listened to reports and discussions for five sessions, over a period of two
and a half years, it is clear to me that the term culture is used to describe
the way of life of- people in rural villages, remote valleys and
mountaintops, and isolated islands. Culture is not found in the UN or
among transnational elites, but only among those still living in what is
often referred to as traditional society. This particular usage of the term
assumes that people with culture live in circumscribed and unchanging
ways governed by strict traditions and share the same set of values and
practices. Female genital cutting is the model for this understanding of
culture, since it is widely seen as a barbaric practice embedded in culture
and very difficult to root out. It is an example of the well-established
category of harmful traditional practices. Such a perspective on culture
is reinforced by human rights documents about women that repeatedly
insist that no cultural, religious, or traditional practice should
undermine women's rights. As experts listen to one country report after
another, they often hear about customs that violate the terms of the
convention and undermine women's rights. They share the widespread
opinion that customs are a remnant of the past that must be changed to
accommodate modernity. Thus, they are predisposed to see customs
such as bulubulu as violating women's rights.
Second, the experts are applying the law. They are acting as a
legal body to enforce compliance with the terms of a treaty ratified by
the country. The human rights system is a legal system committed to the
universal application of a code of conduct and to finding ways to apply
this code to myriad particular situations. Its documents spell out this
shared code, one legitimated by the process of consensual document
production and ratification. This law does not accept the existence of
alternative normative codes as justification to withdraw its scrutiny. Of
course, this universalizing approach is structured by the Convention
itself and the committee's mandate to apply it to all countries equally.
Countries that ratify it assume the burden of conforming to its
requirements, regardless of their specific cultural attributes. Human
rights conventions are not understood as one legal code among
alternatives in a plural legal field.
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The CEDAW committee is not deliberately promoting a
universalistic transnational modernity, but is part of a process in which
the convention itself is the moving force toward transnational
modernity. Indeed, the whole human rights process is based on the
assumption that local features of culture, history, and context should not
override universal principles. Human rights documents create a
universal vision of a just society in which local differences are not
important. Cultural difference is respected, but only within limits: it
does not justify assaults on the bodily integrity of vulnerable
populations. The human rights process is based on the assumption that
local features of culture and history should not override universal
principles concerning how societies should be organized. The goal of the
human rights system is to create a universal vision of a just society in
which local differences are not important.
IV. CONCLUSION
The particularities of local practices and the contexts within
which they operate are often thought of as falling in the domain of
culture. Demands to recognize specific features of context usually
appear as demands to recognize culture. Yet, culture is most often
raised in international forums as an excuse by governments that fail to
act energetically to promote gender equality and the values of autonomy
and choice that are at the heart of the human rights system.
Consequently, transnational women's human rights activists see claims
to respect the particularities of local cultures, traditions, or religious
practices as forms of resistance to their efforts to promote women's
equality. These claims oppose universal women's human rights.
This position has significant implications for the practice of
human rights. It means that there is little sympathy for societies that
have separate personal laws for different religious communities or that
practice customs that violate the terms of the international covenants.
This is a fundamental tension within the structure of global reformism
and human rights: the contradiction between the desire to maintain
cultural diversity and at the same time to achieve progress in terms of
equality, rights, and universality. These two sets of goals are in conflict:
applying a universalistic framework obscures local particularities, but
emphasizing local situations impedes applying universal categories for
reform. Rather than understanding how the practice of bulubulu meshes
with a complex set of kinship interventions, police and court actions, and
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village hierarchies to affect women's protection from rape, and rather
than appreciating the variety of local village and town situations in
which this takes place, the human rights intervention must settle for a
critique of the practice itself, in this case feeding into a resistant ethnic
nationalism that attributes its problems to human rights. Recognizing
the fluid and contested nature of culture, and the extent to which the
human rights project itself is a cultural one, could expand understanding
across the global/local interface.
Finally, foregrounding the work of intermediaries, people who
translate across the cultural boundaries between transnational law and
local normative orders, would help us to understand the dynamics of this
plural legal situation. These translators are often NGO activists,
academics, or local political leaders. Had there been effective
translators between the Fiji government and the CEDAW experts, the
outcome might have been far different. Instead of a sense of opposition
and misunderstanding the hearing might have produced a more
constructive dialogue about how to navigate between changing customs
and urban/rural differences in order to control rape more effectively, a
goal that all the participants shared. But recognizing the role of
translators depends on abandoning notions of culture as an integrated
whole that is to some extent untranslatable into other terms. As the call
for a critical legal pluralism suggests, recognizing forms of intersection
and influence among the constituent parts of culture is of critical
importance.
2006]

